Searching for a definition of negligence usually produces a sentence that sounds authoritative and turns out to be nobody’s actual rule — a paraphrase of a paraphrase, with no source behind it.
Nevada does have a statutory definition of the word. It is short, it is specific, and it sits in a part of the statutes that has nothing to do with a fall in a supermarket. Understanding where it is, and why it does not govern a premises claim, explains more about how these cases are decided than any dictionary entry could.
The short version: the civil standard a slip and fall claim runs on is not defined by statute at all. That is deliberate, and it is not a gap.
Key Takeaways
- Nevada defines “negligence” by statute in NRS 193.018, within the chapter on crimes and punishments.
- That definition measures conduct against the attention “an ordinarily prudent person usually exercises in his or her own business.”
- It operates in the criminal context, where NRS 193.190 requires an act joined with intention or criminal negligence.
- No equivalent statutory definition governs an ordinary civil claim arising from a fall on a property.
- Where the Legislature wanted a defined civil standard it wrote one for a particular field, as it did for professional negligence in NRS 41A.015.
- A standard is applied to facts rather than matched against a formula, which is why the same conduct can be negligent in one setting and not another.
- The absence of a statutory definition for premises claims is a feature of how the standard works, not an absence of law.
Nevada Does Define Negligence, in a Place That Surprises People
The definition is in NRS Chapter 193, which carries the general provisions for crimes and punishments. Among the definitional sections that run from NRS 193.010 to NRS 193.0245 — covering terms like “knowingly,” “malice and maliciously,” “owner” and “property” — is NRS 193.018, headed “Neglect,” “negligence,” “negligent” and “negligently” defined.
That placement tells you what the definition is for. It supplies meaning to the words where they appear in criminal statutes. NRS 193.190 sets out why the chapter needs it: “in every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence.”
So the one place Nevada’s statutes squarely define the word is the place where the consequence of the conduct is a conviction rather than a judgment.
What NRS 193.018 Actually Says
The section provides that “neglect,” “negligence,” “negligent” and “negligently” “import a want of such attention to the nature or probable consequences of an act or omission as an ordinarily prudent person usually exercises in his or her own business.”
Three things in that sentence repay attention.
It is framed as a want of attention — an absence of something — rather than as the doing of a wrongful act. It directs the comparison to “the nature or probable consequences” of what was done or not done, so the question is about what the conduct was likely to lead to rather than what it happened to lead to. And the yardstick is unusual: the attention an ordinarily prudent person “usually exercises in his or her own business.”
That last phrase is the one worth sitting with. The comparison is not to some abstract ideal of carefulness. It is to the ordinary attention people actually give to their own affairs.
Why That Definition Does Not Decide a Slip and Fall Claim
A definitional section in NRS Chapter 193 supplies meaning for the chapter it belongs to and for the criminal provisions that use the term. A claim brought by someone injured on a property is a civil action, and it is not brought under Chapter 193.
This matters practically rather than academically. A reader who finds NRS 193.018 and treats it as the test for their fall case is working from a provision that was written for a different purpose, with a different consequence attached to it, and that the court in a civil case is not applying as the governing rule.
The definition can still be informative about how Nevada talks about the concept. It is not the rule being applied.
Where the Legislature Did Write a Civil Standard
The contrast is what makes the point. When Nevada’s Legislature has wanted a defined standard for a civil claim, it has written one — for a specific field, with specific language.
NRS 41A.015 defines professional negligence as “the failure of a provider of health care, in rendering services, to use the reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances by similarly trained and experienced providers of health care.”
Notice how that is built. It names who it applies to, it specifies the activity, and it fixes the comparison to a defined group — “similarly trained and experienced providers of health care” — rather than to people generally. NRS 41A.017 then defines who counts as a provider of health care, listing the licensed roles the chapter reaches.
That is what a statutory civil standard looks like in Nevada: narrow, drafted for a field, and tied to a comparison group chosen for that field.
Nothing of the kind exists for a fall on a shop floor, a stairwell or a parking structure. The Legislature did not write one, and the omission is consistent rather than accidental, because the premises setting is not a single field with a single comparison group.
What a Standard Is, as Distinct From a Definition
The practical difference between the two is the thing most definitions on the internet obscure.
A definition is matched. Conduct either fits the words or it does not, and the exercise is one of comparison against a fixed text. A standard is applied. The question is put to a finder of fact, who decides it on the evidence about what actually happened in the particular place, at the particular time, with the particular knowledge the parties had.
That is why the same physical facts can produce different answers. A spill left for a short time in a setting where nobody could reasonably have known about it is not the same case as a spill in a location under constant observation, even though the spill and the fall look identical in both.
It also explains why competing accounts of timing, observation and routine matter so much in these cases, and why evidence about what was done on the property — rather than argument about what the word negligence means — tends to decide them.
Why the Absence of a Statutory Definition Is Not a Gap
Readers often take the absence of a definition as a sign that the area is vague or that a claim is on uncertain ground. The opposite is closer to the truth.
A fixed statutory formula would have to be written broadly enough to cover a casino floor, a construction site, a grocery aisle and a residential stairwell, and anything general enough to cover all of them would be too blunt to decide any of them well. Leaving the standard to be applied to facts is what allows the law to treat a brief, unnoticeable hazard differently from one that persisted in plain view.
The Nevada slip and fall guide sets out what a premises claim has to establish and the Nevada provisions that bear on it. What this page adds is why no statute supplies the definition the search term asks for, and why that is the right answer rather than a missing one.
Talk to a Nevada Premises Liability Attorney
Most of the argument in a premises case is about facts rather than about vocabulary — what the condition was, how long it was there, and what was known about it. Those are questions answered with evidence, much of which is held by the property and does not stay available indefinitely.
Vaksman Khalfin, PC acts for injured people across Nevada from the firm’s Las Vegas office at 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150. The first consultation is free, and injury claims are handled on a contingency-fee basis: there is no upfront cost, attorney’s fees are owed only out of a recovery, and fees and case costs are separate items set out in the written agreement. Wider material sits in the Nevada personal injury guides.
Reviewed by Robert B. Vaksman, Partner, Vaksman Khalfin, PC (admitted in Nevada). Last reviewed: 10/30/2026
Frequently Asked Questions
The word is defined in NRS 193.018, within the chapter on crimes and punishments. There is no equivalent statutory definition governing an ordinary civil claim arising from a fall on a property.
It provides that "neglect," "negligence," "negligent" and "negligently" "import a want of such attention to the nature or probable consequences of an act or omission as an ordinarily prudent person usually exercises in his or her own business."
It is a definitional provision in the criminal chapter and supplies meaning for the criminal statutes that use the term. A premises claim is a civil action brought under different provisions, and the section is not the rule a court applies to it.
Because the criminal provisions need it. NRS 193.190 provides that in every crime or public offense "there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence," so the chapter has to say what the word means.
For particular fields, yes. NRS 41A.015 defines professional negligence as a provider of health care's failure "to use the reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances by similarly trained and experienced providers of health care."
It is drafted for a defined group. It names providers of health care, identifies the activity as rendering services, and fixes the comparison to similarly trained and experienced providers, with NRS 41A.017 listing the licensed roles the chapter covers.
By applying a standard to the evidence rather than matching conduct against a formula. The outcome turns on what was shown about the condition, the setting and what was known, which is why two cases with similar-looking facts can be decided differently.
No. A single statutory formula would have to cover every kind of property and would be too general to resolve any particular case well. Applying a standard to facts is what allows a brief, unnoticeable hazard to be treated differently from one that persisted.
