The phrase gets used as though it meant a countdown from the day something happened. That is near enough to be useful and inaccurate in the ways that count, because Nevada’s general provisions are more precise — and the precision is where claims are won or lost.
A limitation period does not run from an incident. It runs from accrual. It can be suspended by circumstances that have nothing to do with the injured person’s diligence. And in a defined situation, a case dismissed after the period has expired can still be brought again.
None of that is obvious from the phrase itself. All of it is in the statutes.
Key Takeaways
- Civil actions “can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action shall have accrued.”
- Accrual, not the date of the incident, is what the statute ties the period to.
- Nevada leaves no gap: a residual provision covers any action not otherwise provided for.
- Where a person is out of the State when the cause of action accrues, the period runs from their return.
- Where they depart afterwards, “the time of the absence shall not be part of the time prescribed.”
- An action dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be recommenced within the applicable period or 90 days after dismissal, whichever is later.
- That recommencement is available only once and not more than 5 years after the original action was commenced.
What the Phrase Actually Means
NRS 11.010 states the rule for every civil action in the state in one sentence: “civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action shall have accrued, except where a different limitation is prescribed by statute.”
Three things are packed into that. The periods are prescribed by the chapter, so they are not a matter of practice or custom. They run “after the cause of action shall have accrued,” which is a legal event rather than a calendar one. And the whole rule yields “where a different limitation is prescribed by statute,” so a provision elsewhere can displace it.
The word doing the work is accrued.
The Period Runs From Accrual
Most of the time, in a fall, accrual and the incident look like the same moment. A person falls, is injured, and knows it. The period starts and nothing about the distinction matters.
The distinction matters when they are not the same moment. A statute that tied the period to “the date of the incident” would say so; NRS 11.010 does not. It ties it to the point at which the cause of action accrued, and what that means in a given situation is a legal question rather than something a person can settle by looking at a calendar.
That is why the safest assumption after a fall is the earliest plausible start date rather than the most favourable one, and why the question is worth putting to someone early rather than reasoning about alone.
Which period applies to a fall here, and the provision prescribing it, appear on the Nevada slip and fall page.
Nevada Leaves No Gap
One feature of the chapter is worth knowing because it answers a question people often have: what happens to a claim that does not fit any of the listed categories.
NRS 11.220 supplies the answer. It provides a period for “an action for relief, not hereinbefore provided for,” running from the point the cause of action accrued — and it adds that this applies “regardless of whether the underlying cause of action is analogous to that of any other cause of action with a statute of limitations expressly prescribed by law.”
That closing clause forecloses an argument. A claim does not borrow another claim’s period by resembling it. Either a provision prescribes a period for that action, or the residual provision applies.
A personal injury claim arising from a fall is provided for elsewhere in the chapter, so the residual period is not the one that governs it.
Absence From the State Suspends the Running
This provision matters more in Nevada than in most states, because of how many people and businesses connected to an incident here are based somewhere else.
NRS 11.300 deals with both directions. If, “when the cause of action shall accrue against a person, the person is out of the State, the action may be commenced within the time herein limited after the person’s return to the State.” And if, after the cause of action has accrued, “the person departs from the State, the time of the absence shall not be part of the time prescribed for the commencement of the action.”
Read who the section is about. It turns on the position of the person against whom the cause of action exists — the prospective defendant — rather than on the claimant’s whereabouts.
For a fall at a property connected to an out-of-state individual, that can change the arithmetic in a way nothing on the face of a calendar would reveal. Whether and how it bears on a given case needs legal advice rather than an assumption running one way or the other.
A Jurisdictional Dismissal Is Not Always the End
NRS 11.500 covers a situation that sounds technical and is not.
Where an action “commenced within the applicable period of limitations is dismissed because the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action,” the action “may be recommenced in the court having jurisdiction within” either “the applicable period of limitations” or “ninety days after the action is dismissed, whichever is later.”
So a claim filed in time but in the wrong court is not automatically lost because the period expired while it was pending there.
The provision has firm limits. Under subsection 2, an action “may be recommenced only one time” on that basis. Under subsection 3, it may not be recommenced on that basis “more than 5 years after the date on which the original action was commenced.” And subsection 4 excludes certain contracts governed by the commercial chapters.
Why a Date on a Calendar Is Not the Whole Question
Putting those provisions together gives a more accurate picture than the usual one.
The period is prescribed by statute rather than chosen. It begins at accrual rather than at an incident, and those can differ. It can be suspended while a prospective defendant is outside Nevada. And a filing made in time can survive a dismissal in a defined circumstance.
What follows is practical rather than reassuring. None of these provisions is a reason to treat a deadline as flexible — each of them is a question that has to be answered correctly, and answering it wrongly in a person’s own favour is the mistake that ends claims. The right response to uncertainty about a limitation period is to resolve it quickly, not to work from the most generous reading.
Ask a Nevada Lawyer About a Deadline
A limitation question is one of the few in this area with a yes or no answer, and it is also the one where being wrong is unrecoverable. It can usually be settled in a single conversation, and there is no advantage in leaving it unsettled.
Vaksman Khalfin, PC acts for injured people across Nevada from the firm’s Las Vegas office at 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150. The first consultation is free, and injury claims are handled on a contingency-fee basis: there is no upfront cost, attorney’s fees are owed only out of a recovery, and fees and case costs are separate items set out in the written agreement. Wider material sits in the Nevada personal injury guides.
Reviewed by Robert B. Vaksman, Partner, Vaksman Khalfin, PC (admitted in Nevada). Last reviewed: 10/30/2026
Frequently Asked Questions
It means a period fixed by statute within which an action must be commenced. NRS 11.010 provides that civil actions "can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action shall have accrued, except where a different limitation is prescribed by statute."
The statute ties it to accrual of the cause of action rather than to the date of an incident. In many falls those coincide, but where they do not, what the statute measures from is accrual.
NRS 11.220 provides a residual period for an action "for relief, not hereinbefore provided for," and states that it applies regardless of whether the claim is analogous to another cause of action with an expressly prescribed period. A fall claim is provided for elsewhere in the chapter.
In defined circumstances. NRS 11.300 provides that where the person against whom the cause of action exists is out of the State when it accrues, the action may be commenced within the time limited after that person's return.
The same section addresses it: where the person departs after the cause of action has accrued, "the time of the absence shall not be part of the time prescribed for the commencement of the action."
The section is framed around the person against whom the cause of action exists rather than the claimant. Whether it applies at all in a given case needs advice on the facts.
Under NRS 11.500, an action commenced within the applicable period but dismissed because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction may be recommenced in the court having jurisdiction within the applicable period or ninety days after dismissal, whichever is later.
No. The section allows recommencement on that basis only one time, and not more than 5 years after the date the original action was commenced.
